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Abstract
This investigation was concerned with how
problem- solving may be

Influenced by personality characteristics and
interactions between
these characteristics and immediate environmental
events which serve
as background for the problem-solving task.

Within this framework of

personality-environmental interactive influences upon
problem-solving
behavior this investigation also attempted to resolve
a theoretical

controversy concerning a widely used personality measure,
the M-C SD
scale.

The question to be resolved was whether this instrument
measured

both an approach-type need for approval and defensive avoidance
of
disapproval as the originators, Crowne and Marlowe, claimed, or whether
the measure could be more parsimoniously interpreted as measuring

avoidant, defensive behavior alone.

Specifically it was posited that

under approving feedback conditions the high M-C SD person would perform

more efficiently than a low M-C SD person on a concept-attainment task,
while under negative feedback the reverse would be true.

It was also

hypothesized that if the M-C SD scale does reflect n-app., the high
M-C SD individual in the approving feedback condition would show a
shorter average latency of response, approach behavior, than high M-C
SD individuals in a control, neutral feedback condition.

The results of

an analysis of variance for the dependent variable measuring problemsolving efficiency were contrary to what had been hypothesized as the
high M-C SD individuals, under the approving feedback condition, were
less efficient than

the.

other sub-groups.

A distractabllity factor was

offered as an explanation for the unexpected results.
ii

The findings

with the dependent measure used to assess approach or
avoidance, re
sponse latency, were inconclusive due to an inability to
establish
a neutral or control group.

It was concluded that though there is

deed some type of evaluative dependency measured by the M-C
SD seal
that this investigation was unable to more specifically clarify
the

nature of this orientation.

ii
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INTRODUCTION

A description of the research context of this proposed
investigation

would state that it is concerned with the effects of the
interaction between personality and immediate enviornmental variables and how
this in-

teraction may influence problem-solving behaviors of an individual.

This

focus upon the interactive effects between the individual's personality
and his immediate environment and how these effects influence behavior
is a reflection of the increasing recognition that accurate behavioral

prediction requires knowledge of conditions which are impinging upon an
individual in a given situation.

A leading proponent of the cross-situ-

ational specificity of behavior is Walter Mischel.

In evaluating current

efforts to tlieorize upon tha nature of personality, he notes that:

Sophisticated dispositional personality theories
increasingly have come to recognize that behavior
tends to change with alterations in the situations
in which it occurs.
They note, however, that the
same basic underlying disposition (or genotype)
may manifest itself behaviorally in diverse ways in
different situations so that heterogeneous behaviors
can be signs of the same underlying trait or state
(Mischel, 1968, p. 38).

I

A more specific example of this increased emphasis upon the importance
of the personality-environment interaction in predicting behavior is

illustrated in the following recent study.
Kates and Barry (1970) showed that successful problem-solving Is de-

pendent both on personality factors and on interactions between these
factors, task-related demands, and environmental conditions.

It was de-

monstrated that individuals assessed as high on the personality characteristic failure-avoidance, under task conditions which required verbalization
of the correct solution of a concept-attainment problem and which involved

|

negative experimenter feedback, in contrast to individuals
low on
failure-avoidance, developed a handicapping caution which
signifi-

cantly impeded task-solution.

However, when conditions were changed

so that (1) task-solution required a non-verbal criterion,

(2)

there

was a subtle omission as to what the tempo of solution
should be, and
(3)

the mode of experimenter feedback

censuring nature, it was the high

v;as

of a more neutral, much less

f ailure-avoidant

who excelled.

The results of this study delineate a personality characteristic,

failure-avoidance, which when prominent in an individual under conditions
of social censure elicits avoidance responses which hinder conceptual

problem-solving.

Further, the findings of Kates and Barry demonstrate

unequivocally that the same basic underlying disposition, failureavoidance, manifests itself behaviorally in apparently diverse ways,

relative success or non-success in concept-attainment, given different
task-related situations.

In doing this,

it empirically reaffirms

Mischel's statement concerning dispositional personality theories.
Finally,

this study in part lends substantiation to the contention that

more focus is needed upon the specific conditions of different test
situations and the interaction between these conditions and motivational
and/or personality factors.
This proposed investigation, then, is a continuation, in terms of
its principal assumptions, of the perspectives on personality expressed

and the study just described.

It assumes that problem-solving behavior

is functionally related to personality dispositions and interactions

between these dispositions and the immediate enviromaent

.

Specifically,
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we shall be Investigating the personality construct
measured by the
Marlowe-Crovme Social Desirability Scale (M-C SD) and which
is
described in the literature as need for approval (n-app.).

This

proposal shall be concerned with assessing the influence of a
high
or low score on the M-C SD scale upon problem-solving behaviors

utilizing concept-attainment tasks and various types of experimenter
feedback.

In addition, and no less importantly, this investigation

shall attempt to resolve a controversy surrounding the M-C SD scale,

which, briefly, is whether the scale can be taken as a measure of

both need for approval and def ensiveness

,

as is claimed by its

originators, or whether the scale measures simply def ensiveness alone.
This investigation represents an initial effort to study the possible

interrelationships between high or low scores on the M-C SD scale with
conceptual tasks under different types of experimental feedback.

THE PERSONALITY VARIABLE
Crowne and Marlowe (1960) have devised a scale
which measures
the degree to which individuals evaluated themselves
in a socially

desirable fashion.

Scores on this scale initially represented re-

sponse sets of individuals in a test-taking situation.

Later, based

upon certain empirical findings, they posited that this social
desirability measure reflected a personality variable, need for approval.
Finally, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability (M-C SD) Scale was

further described as evaluating not only need for approval (n-app.)
but def ensiveness also.

The M-C SD scale is distinguished from its popularly used predecessor, the Edv/ards Social Desirability Scale, in that it uses items
that were either (1) culturally acceptable but probably untrue or
(2)

culturally unacceptable but probably true of most people.

In

either case, these items, unlike those of the Edwards SD scale, were
not clinically oriented.

An example on the M-C SD scale of a culturally

acceptable and probably untrue item would be "I have never intensely
disliked anyone," while an example of a culturally unacceptable and

probably true item is "I like to gossip at times."

On the other hand,

items on the Edwards SD Scale were derived from the M. M.P.I, and, as has

been stated, were clinically oriented.

As a consequence, Crowne and

Marlowe ftit that though the Edwards SD items have been represented as
measuring the

v.'ish

to appear socially desirable,

in truth it may only

be assessing whether an individual will or will not acknowledge whether
he does or does not possess the maladaptive behaviors described in the
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scale.

In summary, the original purpose of the M-C SD scale
was to

serve as a "pure" measure of a person's tendency to portray
himself
in a socially desirable fashion regardless of his degree of
psycho-

logical adjustment.
As was mentioned, the M-C SD scale, at first a response-bias

measure, came to be interpreted as a more personality-related instrument.

Crowne and Marlowe contend that a high score on their in-

strument has broader personality implications than merely representing
a social-desirability response set.

They feel that the high M-C SD

individual is greatly dependent upon the acceptance, recognition, and

approval of others; thus, the M-C SD scale is an indirect measure of
need for approval (n-app.).

In addition to a n-app. interpretation of

their scale, Marlowe and Crowne later posited def ensiveness as being

reflected by their instrument.

This contention that the M-C SD scale

reflects dual personality dispositions of n-app. and def ensiveness is
disputed, however, by Jacobson and Ford (1966) and Ford and Herson
(1967), who believe that the M-C SD scale measures def ensiveness only.

First we will examine how Marlowe and Crowne arrived successively at
the n-app. and def ensiveness interpretations.

Then

v/e

shall take up

the evidence in support of def ensiveness as the sole personality trait

tapped by their instrument.

Marlowe and Crowne (1961) hypothesized that during an experiment,
high M~C SD subjects would try to maintain the favorable evaluation of
the experimenter.

To test this hypothesis, a number of subjects

participated in a tedious, boring experimental task.

Following the

completion of the task, those subjects who attained a
high M-C SD
scale score described their experiences more favorably.

The investi-

gators felt that this favorable evaluation was prompted by
a wish
to ingratiate themselves with the experimenter and portray
themselves

in a favorable, socially sanctioned manner.

They inferred that this

was due to a need on the part of high M-C SD individuals to obtain
approval from others.

A common assumption made by Marlowe and Crowne and associates
was that high M-C SD scale persons enter into psychological experiments
with a strong desire to do well and be positively regarded.
of this entering set,

Because

in a triad of studies of verbal conditioning it

was both predicted and confirmed that high M-C SD subjects would show

more significant conditioning effects.

In the first two experiments,

utilizing direct operant verbal reinforcement, the high M-C SD subjects
produced more plural nouns and positive self -reference (Crowne and
Strickland, 1961; Marlowe, 1962).

reinforcement paradigm.

The third study employed a vicarious

High and low M-C SD subjects were given the'

opportunity to observe others in the experiment prior to their own
participation.

It was hypothesized that, because of their need to do

well in the eyes of the experimenter, the high M-C SD would focus, in
a self -reinforcing manner, on the subtle verbal social rewards given
to the observed subject.

As was stated, the high, as contrasted with

the low M-C SD subjects, did show more rapid conditionability when it

was time for their own participation (Marlowe, Beecher, Cook, and Doob,
196A).
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Further evidence that the M-C SD scale reflects
need for approval

was demonstrated by Olsen (1967).

She found that individuals high on

the M-C SD scale had a higher volunteering rate for psychology
experi-

ments and that this high rate was pronounced when the high M-C
SD indi-

vidual had positive expectations as to his performance during the
experiment.

This finding illustrates the ingratiating behavior of the high

M-C SD subject and his fear of "looking bad" during an experiment.
Consonant with a n-app. interpretation of the M-C SD scale, other investi-

gations indicate that the high M-C SD individual has been found to be

more field-dependent (Rosenfield, 1967), has more difficulty in recognizing
and expressing hostility toward others (Schill and Black, 1967; Conn and
Crowne, 1964), and, if prevailed upon by the experimenter, would cheat
in order to please him (Lanyon and Drotar, 1968).

As has been described, Crowne and Marlowe later added def ensiveness
as an additional personality characteristic reflected by the M-C SD

measure.

In their joint publication (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964), they

outline several studies whose findings cumulatively suggest that the high

M-C SD person is likely to evince self-protective defensive behaviors.
This dual interpretation of the M-C SD score began with Barthel's investi-

gation of the relationship between goal-setting in a game situation and
M-C SD scores (Barthel, 1961).

Barthel first hypothesized that high

M-C SD persons would conform more to normative social standards for goalsetting in a competitive game situation.

In attempting to account for

his positive findings, Barthel included def ensiveness as well as n-app.
in his explanations, equating the behavioral restriction of the high M-C
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SD individual in goal-setting with
"defensive rigidity."

It was in

commenting upon Barthel's findings and "defensive
rigidity" explanation
that Crowne and Marlowe first mentioned defensive
behavior as an

additional correlate of high M-C SD scores.
Strickland and Crowne (1963) further document the
"def ensiveness

hypothesis" as an aspect of the M-C SD scale.

They hypothesized that

high M-C SD individuals, manifesting an avoidant type of
resistance,

would seek early termination of psychotherapy sessions.

They reasoned

that the need for the high M-C SD person to maintain the approval
of

the psychotherapist would cause him to find the demands for personal

revelations, involving self -demeaning characteristics, to the therapist
as too threatening.

This hypothesis was borne out and further confirmed

by the therapist's rating of the high M-C SD individual while in therapy
as being more defensive than the low M-C SD person.

Tutko (1962),

utilizing an institutionalized population, predicted that under stressful instructions the high M-C SD person would give constricted, defensive,

unproductive, and obtensibly less pathological projective test protocols.
This prediction was found to be accurate.

A recent variation of Tutko 's

'

study with college students, using Rorschack's M as a measure of ex-

pressiveness, essentially corroborated his findings and also delineated
the importance of considering the interaction between n-app., defensiveness, and the specific situation in making behavioral predictions

(Lefcourt, 1969).
;

Follow-up studies by other investigators utilizing the M-C SD scale
tend to further illustrate that this scale taps both n-app. and def ensiveness

I
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In practically all of these studies it is assumed
by the investigators

that defensive behavior is a consequence of high
n-app.

In a study

investigating the effects of high and low scores on the M-C
SD scale on

willingness to participate in a group discussion, it was found
that when
high M-C SD individuals were offered a choice between taking
a salient
role involving greater evaluative threat or a less prominent role

offering little opportunity for approbation, they would significantly

more often choose the latter role (Efran and Boylin, 1967).

Another

investigator reasoned that in a group setting, by varying the conditions
under which evaluative feedback is given (either public or private),
the high M-C SD person, because of a need for approval, would manifest

significantly greater sensitivity when feedback was accomplished via
public announcement,

ilis

predictions were accurate (Nicholson, 1967),

and, in addition, it was found that high M-C SD persons were signifi-

cantly more cautious and conservative in setting goals or choosing

difficulty levels in order to ensure success and ward off negative

evaluative feedback.

This is a replication of the findings of an

earlier investigation in which it was demonstrated that high M-C SD
persons under conditions of "ego- threat" take precautions tc guarantee
success in a competitive game situation (Barthel, 1963).

Yet a third

study replicated the cautious goal-setting behavior of high M-C SD

individuals and also supported

tlie

hypothesis that approval-oriented

individuals are viewed by their peers as socially defensive (Thaw and
Efran, 1967).

On the other hand, some studies have used the M-C SD instrument
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as a measure of def ensiveness only.

In order to employ the Taylor

Manifest Anxiety Scale most effectively, the M-C SD scale
was used
to pinpoint and eliminate those defensive Ss who are
prone to

anxiousness but may have refused to admit it on the TMAS.

A signifi-

cant difference on digit symbol performance favoring lov;-anxious
Ss was

found only when the defensive (high SD low-anxious Ss (low TMAS) were

eliminated from analysis (Boor and Schill, 1967).

In another study

concerned with def ensiveness and anxiety, it was hypothesized that

highly defensive Ss (high M-C SD scale score) would have less variance
on the Cattell Anxiety Scale than those Ss low in def ensiveness

The

.

rationale was that highly defensive Ss would be restricted in the extent
to which they could admit to behaviors both socially undesirable and

implicative of psychopathology

,

whereas Ss low in def ensiveness would

include Ss who suffered from psychopathological conditions and admitted
to them as well as Ss who did not suffer from such conditions.

The

prediction was found to be accurate (Fisher and Kramer, 1963).

Breger,

in citing the fact that the high M-C SD subject displays more covert

hostility on the T.A.T. and also the fact of a strong inverse relationship between the M-C SD scale and a measure of insightf ulness

,

supports

the interpretation of the scale as a measure of "repressive ego-def ensive-

ness" (1966).

Another study found a significant but low negative

correlation between the M-C SD scale and the Byrne Repression-Sensitization measure.
the Byrne R-S.

The high M-C SD individual scores on the low end of
Since this end of the Bryne R-S assesses repressive

avoidance and denial-of-threat types of defenses, these results augment

,
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and tend to validate the findings thus far described.

The investi-

gators in this study, on the basis of this relationship
and additional

results which indicate that defensive respressors (high M-C SD,
low
Byrne R-S) had a significantly higher auditory perceptual threshold
for sexual sentences than either sensitizers or non-defensive
repressors

conclude that the M-C

iSD

scale "might be a better instrument for

assessing approach and avoidance behaviors to threatening stimuli than
the Byrne scale" (Schill and Althoff, 1968).

This focus upon the relationship between a repressive denial-

avoidant type of def ensiveness and the M-C SD scale is both reaffirmed
and taken one step further by those individuals who have been cited

earlier as advocates of a def ensiveness only interpretation of the
instrument, Jacobson and Ford (1966) and Ford and Herson (1967).

Jacobson and Ford (1966) feel that their findings indicate that the
high M-C SD person, who is supposed to possess a need to take account
of such cues to gain social approval, is not more sensitive to subtle

cultural cues.

They feel instead that the high M-C SD individual has

an "evaluation-orientation" and that their results indicate "the

orientation is away rather than toward and involves a repressive rather
than a sensitizing type of response."

Ford and Herson (1967) hypothe-

sized that if high M-C SD scale responding .represents def ensiveness

following personal failure the high M-C SD person would manifest less
intropunitiveness, as measured by the Rosenzweig Picture Completion Test.

The confirmation of their hypothesis led them to reiterate the speculation that the "popular interpretation of the M-C SD scale in terms of
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n~app. may need to be revised".

The theoretical differences as to what is measured by
the M-C SD
scale are relatively clearly outlined.

The originators, Crowne and

Marlowe, postulate a need for approval with a concomitant
interpersonal

defensiveness as being reflected in their instrument.

Others imply,

however, that empirical evidence does not justify a need-f or
-approval

construct but supports defensiveness only.

A major focus of this

proposed investigation will be an attempt to clarify this area of
controversy.

It is felt that this clarification can be achieved by

setting up certain experimental conditions, involving approving and

censuring experimenter feedback, within which individuals shall be
required to solve a conceptual task and, by using latency of responses
to task stimuli as a dependent measure, to assess need for approval

(approach) and/or defensiveness (avoidance) tendencies.
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THE PERSONALITY-ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTION
Experimental conditions set up to achieve the goal of
clarifying
what the M-C SD scale measures have been mentioned.

In order to

understand how these experimental conditions and a dependent
measure,
latency of response, may resolve this theoretical controversy,
it may

be helpful to briefly review pertinent background research in two
areas.

The first area concerns itself with how personality character-

istics effect success or failure in problem-solving and performance
tasks, Strickland and Jenkins (1964) hypothesized that the high M-C
SD scale score individual's desire to do as well as possible in social

situations would be generalized to performance on motor tasks.

Their

results indicated that the high M-C SD scale individual showed a

significantly better performance rate than the low M~C SD individual
with a rotary-pursuit, time-on -target type of task.

These investigators

concluded that, in general, high M~C SD Ss tend to perform as

v/ell as

possible in order to maintain the favorable evaluation of others;
hence,

they responded to the perceived demands of E and the situation

in a cooperative

confirmed that

better on

a

J

tlie

achieving manner.

Wellington and Strickland (1965)

high M~C SD individuals would perform significantly

series of motor tasks, which led them to posit a general

relationship between desire to achieve favorable evaluations and motor
and social behavior.

Rosenfield (1967) predicted that because of the

high M-C SD individual's omnipresent fear of being negatively evaluated,
a delayed auditory feedback task, which is highly conducive to eliciting

errors, would be especially threatening to these individuals and that

they would consequently have a slower rate of speech
in the D.A.F.
to guard against errors in the form of speech
disruption.

sults of the study confirmed Rosenfield's predictions.

The re-

Finally,

Crandall (1968) found that high M-C SD persons required
fewer trials
to learn a paired-associates task because, as he states,
of their

strong ego-involvement.

Representative of the second body of research, concerned with
the effects of experimenter feedback upon human problem-solving, are
the early studies of Hulon and Katz (1935) and Silleck and Lapha
(1937).

Both investigations, in assessing the relative effects of

emphasis upon right or wrong responses in human maze-learning, demon
strated inferior performances for those individuals who learned via

an experimenter focus upon their mistakes.

Sechrest and Wallace

(1962), on the basis of their findings, speculated that experimenter

feedback may be interpreted by subjects as either an informational

response or as an aversive appraisal.

Later, Wallace (196A) found

that hypothesis-inhibition occurred significantly more often with

negative herbal feedback

("vTrong'"

or"incorrect") than when in im-

personal auditory tone of low intensity was used.
a definite manner,

He concluded, in

that human verbal feedback may take on aversive

properties and thus has a motivational as well as informational
potential.

Byers (1965) noted that subjects increasingly delayed

responding and offered fewer responses, or hypotheses, about the
concept as they progressed through a series of concept-attainment
problems.

He suggested that the subjects inhibited hypothesis-

verbalizations to avoid experimental invalidations which they

.
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interpreted to be punitive and delayed these
verbalizations until
they obtained what they believed to be the
necessary supportive

evidence
In the above investigations, as with that of Kates
and Barry
(1970), reluctance to respond on the part of the subject has
either

been speculated upon or directly interpreted as an avoidance
tendency
prompted by verbal experimenter invalidations which have
aversive
properties.

Buss (1956), utilizing latency of response to conceptual

stimuli as an explicit dependent measure, conducted an especially

relevant experiment since, in addition, he used the specific types of

corrective verbal feedback ("right" or "wrong") which shall be used
in this proposal.

He found that groups exposed to a preponderance of

corrective "rights" had significantly shorter response latencies than
groups who underwent verbal feedback consisting primarily of "wrong."
\7hat

is important to glean from these studies

(Buss

,

1956; Sechrest

and Wallace, 1962; Wallace, 1964; Kates and Barry, 1970) is that

negative verbal experimenter feedback appears to be an important factor

with respect to response-delay shown by subjects.

Consequently, for

this proposal response latency has been chosen as a dependent variable
to measure the length of time taken by subjects to respond under

different verbal feedback conditions.

It is hoped that this latency

measure will reveal whether high M-C SD subjects delay longer under
negative feedback (show avoidant defensive characteristics) and/or
respond more quickly (show approach tendencies) when positive evaluation is anticipated.

This use of latency of response as a measure of
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approach-avoidance behavior is not without research
precedence.
Marlett and Watson (1968), demonstrating that failure
feedback
over trials increased the strength of avoidance
behavior, used

latency of response as a measure of avoidance.

It is not too

much of an inferential leap to say that if increased
response
latency is taken as a

fiieasure of

avoidance, then decreased

latency of response can be used to indicate approach.
In this section so far we have briefly reviewed background

studies on the effects first of personality characteristics and
then of experimental feedback variables upon performance in

problem-solving and performance tasks.

To conclude this section

of the proposal, it may be most appropriate to describe a couple
of studies which have special relevance in that both personality

and experimental feedback variables are manipulated concurrently,
as shall be done in this proposed investigation.

Heilbrun, Orr, and Harrell (1966) demonstrated a relationship

between different patterns of parental child-rearing and vulnerability to cognitive disturbance when mistakes in a cognitive task
resulted in social censure.

They found that a group of college

students in the parent-rejected group (high control-lov; nurturance)

demonstrated significant impairment of conceptual performance under
censuring conditions

(a

verbal response "wrong")

.

In explaining

the significant learning inefficiency of the parent-rejected group,

these investigators offered an interpretation of an internal,

interfering, avoidant- type response which was incompatible with
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effective task-behavior.

Thus, in this study an interaction

between differing family antecedents, conditions
of nurturance
and control, and censuring experimenter
feedback results in

individual differences in perception of experimenter
feedback
and apparently causes differential cognitive
functioning on a

concept-attainment task.

Strickland (1965) found that of four

experimental groups, the high M-C SD subjects run under
positive,

approving conditions showed the greatest improvement in motor
performance over trials, while the high M-C SD subjects, under

negative-feedback conditions, showed the poorest performance.
This study demonstrates the greater disposition of the high M-C
SD individual to be influenced, for better or worse, by positive

and negative verbal feedback.
To sum up this section of the proposal, it has first been an

attempt to describe a number of research studies which serve as
the background from which this investigation shall be a logical

extension.

More specifically, two of the primary experimental

conditions shall consist of a personality variable, high or low

M-C SD scale scores, and three types of experimenter feedback,
approving, censuring, and neutral.

In establishing the research

precedence for these experimental conditions, the results of the
findings of these studies shall also be influential in determining
the content of

tlie

formal hypotheses which shall be stated.

Secondly,

within this section several studies have been cited which serve as
the empirical rationale for the use of latency of response as a measure

.

of approach and avoidance.

The following section of the proposal

pertains to the third and last experimental condition,
level of
problem-dif f iculty
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THE CONCEPTUAL TASK
The tasks which shall be used in this proposed
investigation

fall within the realm of conceptual learning.

As is pointed out by

Bourne (1966), the term "concept" has a number of
definitions.

Roughly paraphrasing, it can mean an idea, refer to an
abstraction,
or perhaps be synonymous with a mental image.

With respect to this

investigation. Bourne's operational definition of a concept "as a

category of things" or "a concept exists whenever two or more dls
tinguishable objects or events have been grouped or classified together and set apart from other objects on the basis of some common

feature or property characteristic of each" is quite appropriate.
Uaygood and Bourne (1965) have demonstrated that conceptual

learning can be analyzed into two major components, attribute or

value identification and recognition of the conceptual rule.

As an

example of the first component, utilizing the dimension geometric
forms, the attributes or values of this dimension which may have to

be identified might involve squareness, roundness, or triangularity.
Secondly, In order to attain a concept, an Individual must also be

able to recognize the conceptual rule by which the values are combined
to form the concept.

As defined by Bourne (1966), "Conceptual rules

are rules for grouping.

They specify how the relevant attributes are

combined for use in classifying stimuli."

As examples of conceptual

rules, the two types which shall be used in this investigation and

which will create the third and final independent variable, level of
problem-difficulty, can be briefly described.
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The first type of rule is that of conjunctiveness,
in which

examples of a particular concept involve the "joint
presence of"
two or more attributes.

For example, if the concept is that of a

red square, then all examples (or instances) which contain both

redness and squareness together would be
concept.

representative of the

The second, and more difficult, type of rule is that of

disjunctivGness, in which examples of a particular concept involve
the presence of "either one or the other of

tv;o

or more attributes."

Again, if the concept is that of a red square, then all instances

which contain either redness or squareness (and both together in
the case of inclusive disjunctiveness) would be representative of
the concept.

Various writers have speculated as to why disjunctivity in
conceptual learning results in much greater problem-difficulty as
contrasted with conjunctiveness.

In delineating the reasons for

these differences in difficulty, Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1962)
point out that there is an "asymmetry of inference from defining

attributes to class membership and from class member sliip to defining
attributes" that is existent with disjunctivenss but not with
conjuncti-irity

.

Knowing the definitions of the disjunctive class

(red squares) can lead only to probabilistic predictions about the

properties of exemplars (either red or square).

As Shore (1967)

points out, on the other hand, with conjunctive concepts, certainty

statements may be made, since deduction of the concept (red squares)

depends on the presence of the relevant features (redness and squareness)

.

'
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in all Instances of the concept.

Thus, one can make absolute pre-

dictions about the relevant attributes of an example
of a conjunctive
concept while there is uncertainty in this
respect with disjunctive
concepts.

Bruner suggests that this certainty of prediction
is

responsible for the preference which people demonstrate
for conjunctive

conceptualization as contrasted with disjunctiveness
In the study by Kates and Barry (1970)

,

it was demonstrated that

a personality variable which was influential in determining
efficiency

in attaining disjunctive concepts did not have as pronounced
affects

with conjunctive problems.

By including this independent variable,

level of problem-difficulty, it is hoped that the generalizability of
these findings can be assessed under different experimental conditions,

utilizing the M-C SD scale.
To summarize, a broad aim of this investigation is to attempt to

ascertain in what manner problem-solving behavior may be related to
personality characteristics and interactions between these characteristics and varying surroundings within which the problem is presented.

Specifically stated, a prime concern is whether high-or-low
scoring M~C SD individuals are differentially affected in their concept-

attainment efficiency under various types of experimenter feedback,
censuring, approving, and neutral, with two different levels of

problem-difficulty, disjunctive and conjunctive.

Within this framework

of possible personality-environment influences upon concept-attainment

behavior, this investigation shall also attempt to resolve a theoretical

controversy extant concerning the widely used personality measure, the

M-C SD scale.

Simply stated, the problem to be resolved
is whether

this instrument measures both an approach-type
need for approval and

defensive avoidance of disapproval, as the originators,
Crowne and
Marlowe, claim, or whether the measure can be more
parsimoniously
interpreted as measuring avoidant defensive behavior
alone.

It is

hoped that with the aid of the three types of experimenter
feedback

described and utilizing a second dependent measure, latency
of response, this question may be clarified.

MAJOR HYPOTHESES
The first set of hypotheses which
pertain to the independent
variable, type of experimenter feedback,
and the dependent variable,

average latency of response, is as follows:
1.

The approving type of experimenter feedback
will

generate approach responses generally among
high
and low M-C SD subjects, resulting in shorter

average response latencies than under the
neutral

feedback condition.
2.

A disapproving type of experimenter feedback will
generate avoidance responses generally among both

high and low M-C SD subjects, causing the average

response latency to be significantly longer than
for the neutral feedback condition.
3.

The significant effects predicted above for the

latency of response and type of experimenter

feedback shall hold under both levels of problemdifficulty, disjunctive and conjunctive.
The second set of hypotheses pertaining to the independent variable,

high or low M-C SD scale score, and the dependent variable, average
latency of response, is as follows:
4.

Reflecting the consensus of opinion as to a defensive avoidant component associated with a high

M-C SD scale score, individuals in this group
under the disapproving condition shall have a
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significantly longer average latency of
response
than the high M-C SD control group.

In addition,

this longer latency shall be longer
than that for

any group or subgroup in the design.
5.

Relevant to response latency of the M-C SD
groups
under approving feedback, if a high M-C SD
scale
score is in fact reflective of a high n-app.,
then approval-seeking, approach types of behavior

among the high M-C SD group shall result in a

significantly shorter average response latency
as contrasted with the control.

In addition,

this significantly shorter latency should be

shorter than that for any other group or subgroup in the design.
6.

The significant effects both predicted and con-

ditionally hypothesized as occurring with respect
to the dependent measure latency of response and

the variable high or low score on the M-C SD

scale shall hold under both levels of problemdifficulty, disjunctive and conjunctive.

The third and final set of hypotheses pertains to the number of

instances to solution, the dependent variable measuring efficiency
of problem-solving, and the independent measure of high and low M-C

SD scale score and type of experimenter feedback:

If we can generalize from previously
cited

studies, it can be hypothesized that the

efficiency of the high M-C SD person under

censuring feedback will be impaired, resulting in a significantly higher number of
trials to solution than that of the low M-C
SD individual.

Conversely, and again making a tentative

generalization from prior studies, the high
M-C SD group under the approving condition

will be more efficient than the low's,
requiring fewer number of trials to criterion.
The final hypothesis is that the differences
in efficiency hypothesized for the personality

variable high or low M-C SD will be most
pronounced under the higher level of problem-

difficulty involving the disjunctive task.
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METHOD
SUBJECTS
The M-C SD scale was administered to a group of
365 students at
the University of Massachusetts.

for the experimental groups.

There were two criteria for selection

First an individuals scale score had to

fall at either extreme of the distribution.

Those individuals who fell

in the high M-C SD scale group had a mean of X « 21.03.
in the low M-C SD scale group had a mean of X = A. 78.

Those individuals
For both the

extreme groups on the personality measure, either high or low,
those
sub-groups in the three feedback conditions did not have M-C SD scale

means which differed significantly from the total mean for their
particular extreme group.
The second criterion for selection involved sex as each of the sub-

groups at either extreme was balanced for this variable.

Studies both

past (Crowne and Marlowe; 1960) and more recent (Cosentino and Kahn,
1967) had found no significant differences between the means and variances
of male and female M-C SD distributions however it was felt that it

might have been presumptuous to assume a between-sex personality
equivalence for individuals

v/ith

similar M-C SD scale scores.

From the sample of students pre-administered the M-C SD scale, and
on the basis of the above criteria, a total of 72 subjects were chosen

and participated in the experiment;, 12 high M-C SD scale people and 12

low H-C SD people for each of the three feedback conditions.
I)E_SIGN

The experimental design was a 2x3x2 (two between and one within)
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analysis of variance.

The first, two-leveled condition was
the

personality variable represented by either a high
or a low score on
the M-C SD scale.

The three-leveled variable was the different
types

of corrective feedback conditions consisting
of negative (social

censure), positive (approving), and the neutral
reinforcement schedules.

The within variable the two tasks were incorporated
in the design in
counter-balanced fashion in order to control for possible
sequential
effects.

MATERIALS

AITD

APPARATUS

The M-C SD scale, which is a true-false questionnaire, 33 items
long, V7as administered in conjunction with a computer scoring
sheet.

The standard instructions for this instrument preceded the test items

along with additional information describing the correct spaces to
fill in on the scoring sheet representing either a true or false response
The stimulus patterns used for the two concept-attainment tasks

were geometric designs prepared on slides for use in a slide projector.
These geometric designs varied along four three-value dimensions.

dimensions and their values were:

The

form (square, diamond, and triangle)

color (orange, yellow, and green), Arabic number inside of each form
(1,

2,

and 3), and type of border around form (none, dotted and solid).

Total number of instances (slides) generated by the four three-valued
dimensions described was 81.

During the performance of the two concept-

attainment tasks each slide was presented to each subject one at a time
(reception strategy) in exactly the same random order.
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A sample chart showing all possible values of each
dimension
was left exposed at all times.

The subject and the experimenter

sat in the same room, with the subject's back
toward the experimenter.

Two specially built electric consoles with lights and
toggle switches

were used for subject choice and experimenter feedback.
of stimuli

v;as

Presentation

performed by remote-control of two slide-projectors

situated directly in back of the subject with the slides being
pro-

jected directly on the wall in front of him.

Response latency was

recorded on graph paper of a single-needle chronographer which

traveled at the rate of 1 millimenter per 0.7 second.

PROCEDUR E
At the outset of the concept-attainment tasks, all subjects were

given detailed oral instructions describing the stimulus population.
These instructions were worded as follows:
In this experiment we are interested in how

various individuals go about solving conceptual
tasks.

These tasks use a series of illustrated

slides which will be displayed, one at a time,

on the wall in front of you.

Each of the slides

contains one geometric figure representing four

different dimensions, with three values for
each dimension.

On the wall in front of you,

you wil see a chart illustrating the four
dimensions and the three values for each dimension.
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—

Dimension

//I

is form, and its three values,

shovm to the right of it, are diamond, square
and triangle.

—

Dimension #2 is color, the geometric shapes
just mentioned can be colored green, orange,
or yiellow.

—

Dimension

//3

is the Arabic number inside

each form, and its values are the numbers
1,

—

2,

and 3.

Dimension #4 is the kind of border around
each shape; a solid border, a dotted border,
or no border.

Following this description of the task materials and an elicitation
of the subject's comprehension of these materials, each subject was re-

quired to participate in a practice task consisting of a simple uni-

dimensional concept of only one value.

In the practice task, each sub-

ject was required to move a switch to a "yes" or "no" position if he

believes a stimulus card does nor does not include the correct value
no border and the conceptual rule (any card having the value no border

on it was an example of the correct concept).

In this practice task,

the other three dimensions were irrelevant to solution.

The rationale for the inclusion of a preliminary task was to

(1)

reduce unwanted inter-individual variability (error variance) due to

differences in acclimatization to the task materials, procedures, and
equipment and (2) to present an opportunity for the assimilation by

S
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of the particular type of experimenter corrective
feedback conditions
(neutral, censuring, or approving) which he underwent.

The instructions for the practice task read as follows:
Let's do a simple practice problem first.
In it I will be thinking of only one of

the values on the chart, and you must find
out which value I am thinking of.

After

the slide is exposed on the wall in front
of you, you shall indicate whether the

slide does or does not contain the value
I

am thinking of.

If you think it does,

push the switch in front of you to the
"yes" position; if you think it doesn't,

push it to the "no" position.
At this point the content of the instructions varied depending upon

the particular experimenter feedback condition the

S

had been assigned to

For the neutral feedback condition the instructions stated;
If you are correct in your choice,

then

the white light directly in front of you

shall flash on.

If you are incorrect,

the

amber light will flash on.
For the censuring feedback condition, the instructions stated:
If you are correct in your choice,

then

the white light directly in front of you
shall flash on and we shall go on to the
next card.

If you are incorrect in your

choice, I shall inform you of this by

saying "wrong" and the amber light will

flash on.
For the approving feedback condition, the
instructions stated:
If you are correct in your choice,

I

shall inform you of this by saying
"right" and the white light will flash
on.

If you are incorrect in your

coice the amber light will flash on.

After allowing for this instructional variability, which specif
the particular corrective feedback condition to which the subject be
longed, the instructions for the practice task continued along, exac
the same for all subjects as follows;

Before we begin this practice task,

I

am going to give you a clue and state
that the one value

I

am thinking of is

associated with one of the two dimensions
of border or number.

The two other

dimensions, and their associated values,

form and color, do not have to be considered.

A last v7ord is that in order

for this practice task to be considered

successfully solved, you must be correct
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in your choice of "yes" or "no" for
ten

consecutive slides.
After successful completion of this simple practice
task, the
instructions for the main experimental tasks was worded
as follows:

Now we shall go on to the main task.
•

In

this task, as in the practice task, the

sequence in which the slides appear is
not important, since they are randomly

presented on the wall.

The task is

different from the practice task in
important ways.

The first difference

is that now not one but two values are

important, and you must discover which

these two values are.
As before,

I

am going to give you a clue

and state that the two values

I

am

thinking of are associated with the two

dimensions of form and color.

The two

other dimensions and their associated

values, number and border, do not have
to be considered.

The reason for the introduction of these clues, which gave the subject a correct dimensional focus, was founded upon the experience of
this writer with this type of concept-attainment task.

Just as a minimum

difficulty level is required, so too was an optimal level desired.

This
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optimal level should be such that a reliably long sampling
of subject behavior can be obtained while at the same time there
would not

be any sizeable attrition of N due to too many subjects who cannot
solve the problem within a practically feasible time.

The clues as

to the correct dimensions enhanced the goal of an optimum difficulty

level for this type of concept-attainment task.

The first dependent measure was response latency which was

averaged for each individual while the second was a record of the
number of instances (slides) which the subject required to solve the
problem, with the criterion of problem-solution requiring 10 consecutive

correct responses.

Further after the subject had achieved this operational

criterion he had to verbally state the two correct values and also the
rule which governed their relationship: ex; for the conjunctive task

"both together", "always on the same slide", etc.

For the disjunctive

task "can be either one or the other", "can be by themselves" "doesn't

have to be together", etc.
The inter-trial interval for presentation of the task stimuli was

automatically set at

5

seconds.

It was found that this interval allowed

ample time for the experimenter to record the subjects response and give
the appropriate feedback.

Of those individuals selected for the ex-

periment only three proved unable to understand the procedure even after

completion of the practice task and were disqualified from the experiment
and replaced by three others.

This experimenter during presentation of

the task stimuli verbalized the feedback, either approving or dis-

approving, with a studied monotone neither varying the intensity or

the inflection throughout a particular
sequence of presentations.
It should be noted however, that
for those individuals who took,

relatively speaking

,

an excessive amount of time in
responding to the

stimuli this investigator was aware of
subjective feelings of im-

patience which may have influenced adversely
his attempt at standardizing the verbal feedback.
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RESULTS

With respect to the hypotheses which have been made,
and taking them
In the order in which they have been presented, the
statistical

analysis indicated the following results.
1.

The first hypothesis pertains to the relationship

between the independent variable type of experimenter feedback and the dependent variable latency
of response.

This hypothesis was not supported;

the approving type of experimenter feedback did

not result in shorter response latency as com-

pared to the length of latency under the neutral
condition.

Insert Table 1 and 15

2.

The second hypothesis was not confirmed.

The dis-

approving type of experimenter feedback was not
associated with a significantly longer average

response latency than was the neutral experimental
feedback condition.

Insert Table 1 and 15

3.

The third and last hypothesis which pertained to the
type of experimenter feedback and average latency
of response was predicated upon statistically sig-

nificant findings occurring between these independent
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and dependent variables and stated that these

significant findings would hold under two levels
of problem difficulty, disjunctive and conjunctive.

Needless to say the lack of significance described invalidates this particular hypothesis.

Insert Table 5 and 15

The second set of hypotheses pertained to the independent variable

high or low M-C SD scale score and the dependent variable average
latency of response.
A.

The statistical analysis indicated the following:

It was hypothesized that if in fact there is a

defensive avoidant component associated with a
high M-C SD scale score, individuals in this group
under the disapproving condition would have a
longer average latency of response than high M-C
SD people in the control or neutral feedback

condition.

Reference to Table

A

indicates that

this did occur; however, Table 15 demonstrates
no significant differences between these two

means.

Therefore this fourth hypothesis is

rejected.

Insert Table

5.

4

and 15

This hypothesis was concerned with the average response

latency of the high M-C SD individuals in the approving

condition vls-a-vis high M-C SD people In the
neutral feedback condition.

The rationale was

that If the high M-C SD scale score Is In fact

reflective of approval-seeking this would arouse
approach types of behavior.

Hence there would

be shorter average response latencies of the

highs under the approving condition versus the
highs under the neutral condition.

As indicated

in Table A this did not occur and in fact the

high M-C SD people under the approving condition
had a somawhat longer average latency of response

than those under the neutral though the difference

was not significant as indicated by Table 15.
6.

This hypothesis was concerned with whether the

predictions made earlier (involving hypotheses
four and five) would hold under the two levels of

problem difficulty, the disjunctive task versus
the relatively easier conjunctive task.

Since the

predictions were not confirmed this particular
hypothesis is rendered invalid.

Insert Table

7

and 15

The third and last set of hypotheses pertained to the dependent var

measuring efficiency of problem solving, that is the number of tria

.

needed to reach a criterion of problem solution,
and to the two
independent variables involving the personality
measure of high
and low M-C SD scale scores and the three experimentally
man-

ipulated feedback conditions; neutral, approving, and
disapproving.
7.

Based upon the findings of prior research it was

hypothesized that the efficiency of the high M-C
SD person under censuring feedback V70uld be im-

paired resulting in a significantly higher number
of trials to solution than that of the low M-C

SD individual.

Both Tables 11 and 16 indicate

respectively first the means and second there
are no significant differences between these means.

Insert Table 11 and 16

The efficiency of both personality groups high and low M-C SD

under the disapproving feedback condition is approximately the
same
8.

This hypothesis again was based upon prior studies

and stated the converse of the seventh hypothesis

namely that high M-C SD groups under the approving

condition

v;ill be

more efficient than the lows

and would require fev^er number of trials to criterion.

The statistical analysis indicates just the opposite.

The high M-C SD subjects were less efficient in solving
the problems under the approving feedback.

.

Insert Table 11

9.

The final hypothesis pertained to the level
of

problem difficulty and differences in problem
solving efficiency as a function of the person-

ality variable.

It was generated by the prior

two hypotheses, seven and eight, and by a study

cited in the introductory section of this in-

vestigation.

It stated that the effects pre-

dicted for hypotheses seven and eight would be

most pronounced with the more difficult dis-

junctive conceptual task.

Referring to Table

14 and 16 it can be seen that the feedback X

personality scale X task interaction was not
significant

Insert Table 14 and 16

The nonsignificant differences betwen the high and
lo\-f

M-C SD groups under the censuring feedback

condition hold up under both the difficult disjunctive
task and the easier conjunctive task and the same is
tcue for the approving feedback condition.
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DISCUSSION
One primary focus of this investigation was
to attempt to ascertain

whether a high score on the Crowne-Marlowe Social
Desirability Scale
(M-C SD scale) was indicative of both a high
need for approval (n-app.)

and a high level of def ensiveness as the originators
of the scale claim
or whether, as other investigators hypothesized,
a high scale could onlv

be interpreted as measuring def ensiveness alone.

The initial portion of

this investigation outlined research findings first supporting
the high
(n-app.) and def ensiveness point of view and then included a
review of

that literature which substantiated a def ensiveness only
hypothesis.

After

t:-.e

presentation of conflicting opinions and review of litera-

ture cited as evidence by both sides this investigator set forth an experiinent which he felt might contribute to the resolution of the opposing

views regarding this personality measure.

This experiment

upon certain assumptions and research findings.

v;as

founded

Though these assumptions

and findings are intertwined with each other, for the sake of clarity it
is best to consider them separately.

In order to define def ensiveness and approval seeking it was first

assumed that

terras

which could be substituted, and which had the advantage

of being more measurable were, respectively, avoidance and approach.

Using avoidance as an operational measure of def ensiveness does not appear
to be that unwarranted since personality theories,

research findings,

and everyday life experience. all offer evidence that avoidance behavior

can be and is used in this manner.

Likewise, although approval-seeking

can take many behavioral forms within the human context, approach- types

Al
of behavior nay be one of the more prominent of
these forms.

Avoidance

and approach can be measured spatially or temporally,
that is in terms
of amount of distance or of time.

It was with respect to amount of

time elapsed between presentation of a stimulus,
in this case conceptual

task stimuli, and subject response that this experiment
quantified

avoidance and approach.

More specifically the dependent measure, re-

sponse latency, was reflected in seconds with decimal places
rounded
off to one-hundreth of a second.

The above is a description of the assumptions underlying the selection
of the dependent measure, response latency.

related to the design of the experiment and

Another primary assumption
vjas

responsible for the se-

lection of the particular feedback conditions described in the methodology.
It was assumed that three feedback conditions could be established which,

in general, without consideration of personality variables, would result
in average

response latencies which were shortest for a positively re-

inforcing verbal feedback, longest for a negatively reinforcing verbal
feedback, and intermediate when non-verbal visual cues, specifically
lights, were used as feedback.

It was felt that this last condition, by

dint of its intermediate average response latencies, could be characterized
as "neutral" with respect to the other two feedback conditions.

More

specifically it was assumed a "neutral" feedback condition could be established since there is research precedence for the predictions of the

ordinal rankings of the average response latencies for the two verbal

feedback conditions (Buss, 1956).
The rationale for the attempt to establish a "neutral" condition was

two-fold.

First it was hoped that within the confines

of'

this experiment

.
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establishing this intermediate response latency
condition would lend
empirical substantiation to the assumption described
earlier that is
brief response latency can indicate approach behavior
which in turn can

be taken as a manifestation of approval seeking.

And, also, prolonged

response latency under negative feedback would give confirmation
to the
labeling of the slower reaction time as avoidance behavior which
in turn

can be considered as indicative of def ensiveness
In addition to attempting to justify the labeling of two verbal

feedback conditions, a second reason for attempting to set up a "neutral"

condition resides in the usage of the control group in psychological research.

In the design of this particular experiment the neutral feedback

condition was also

intended to function as a control group.

The procedure

of this feedback condition was exactly that of the other two with the sole

exception of the verbali^^ations "right" or "wrong" being ommirted.
The last few paragraphs have been devoted to a description of the

logical assumptions underlying the selection of the dependent variable,

response latency.

'

Additionally there was focus upon the necessity for the

establishment of a "neutral" feedback condition both in terms of lending

accuracy semantically

,

to the labeling of the two verbal feedback conditions,

and also in terms of its' functioning as a control group which would put to

stringent test the acceptance or rejection of a need for approval construct

associated with the M-C SD scale.
However, a statistical trend did not occur in which response latencies
in the so-called neutral condition were, on the average, intermediate with

those of the verbal feedback conditions.

In this experiment,

the lack of

statistical results, both in terms of significance and the desired mean

.

trend for the average response
latencies Indicate a failure In
establishing a neutral feedback condition
and consequent adequate
control group.

Therefore this experiment cannot offer
any resolution of the theoretical
controversy.
Perhaps one of the first, most obvious
speculation, which could be

made as to the failure in establishing
significant findings with the
dependent measure, response latency, was
that it was correlated with the
second measure, trials to criterion.

That is that the tendency of an in-

dividual to respond quickly or slowly to the
task stimuli is influenced
by the ability of the individual to solve the
problem efficiently.

A simultaneous comparison of the group means for
the two dependent
variables indicates no such correlative relationship.

No clearcut pattern

can be observed whereby average reaction time can be
established as

a co-

factor in either a more efficient or less efficient solution
of the problem.

While the efficiency of the low M-C SD group is approximately the
same
across feedback conditions there is relatively greater variability in

average response latency.

Conversely we find relatively substantial

variability across feedback conditions for the high M-C SD group in trials
to solution while, compared to the lows,

latencies is less.

the variability of mean response

A Pearson product moment calculated between the two

dependent measures for the 72 subjects indicates an

r =

+ .15 which is

nonsignificant

Comparative observations of the means of the two dependent variables,
and a statistical calculation indicate no correlative trend.

relationship appears to be random

v.'hich

Instead the

in turn tends to invalidate the

speculation that the lack of significant findings among groups for average

4A

latency of response was due to differing
capabilities of the groups in
problem solving efficiency.

Focusing upon the methodology as the problem
area the appropriateness of the modalities of the feedback
conditions, verbal and an Im-

personal visual cue, could be questioned.

In the methodology of those

studies of most relevance, in terms of examining
response inhibition as
a function of different types of feedback,
we find that the procedural

differences outweigh the similarities with this experiment.

Direct

comparison of the results of other studies with this one is
rendered
difficult because others (Buss, A. 1950, Byers,

J.

L.

,

1965, Marlett, N.

J,

and Watson 1968, Sechest, L., and Wallace, J., 1962, Wallace,
J. 196A) did
not establish

a

third or neutral feedback condition.

Further the combinations of feedback modalities used, were, for
the most part distinctly different, V7ith the exception of one study

(Kates S. and Barry W. 1970) which used both verbal and visual feedback.
In two studies which most closely approximated this one in terms of the

use of a precise time measure, response latency, only verbal feedback
("right or wrong") was used in one (Buss A. 1950) or impersonal auditory

feedback

(a

buzzer) was used in the other (Marlett

N.

and Watson D. 1968).

Despite the lack of precedence in attempting to establish

a

neutral con-

dition and the dissimilarities in the types of feedback modalities or
dependent measures used it is important to note that the results of this
experiment are not contradictory

v.'ith

other findings.

That is the mean

trend, specifically with respect to the failure feedback condition, was

congruent in that this type of feedback result in greater response inhibition.

However,

it should be noted the results of this study did not
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indicate statistically significant
response inhibition.

What has been established by this investigation
is that a neutral

condition and its defining attributes are
difficult to establish.

In

analyzing the inability to establish a neutral
condition for latency of
response one can conjecture that perhaps some other
type of feedback

would have been more appropriate.

Perhaps the utilization of an im-

personal auditory signal at an intensity level just
sufficient for discrimination, as was done by Wallace (Wallace

J.

tated the establishment of a neutral condition.

1964) would have facili-

Several post hoc con-

jectures can be made regarding what might be a more appropriate
type
of feedback; however,

this essentially is an empirical question best

answered by further experimentation.

Another consideration concerning the inability to establish

a

neutral

condition is prompted by the average response latencies for those individuals under the verbal feedback conditions.

They attained a consistently

longer reaction time than those in the visual feedback condition for both
the easy (conjunctive) and the difficult (disjunctive) task.

One could

speculate that subjects in this experiment inhibited responding whether
the verbal feedback was approving or disapproving relative to an impersonal

visual one.

The above is not meant as a generalization but as a statement

specific to this experiment.

It is important to note this specificity

since it is obvious that if the modality of the neutral feedback were in-

tense enough, a glaring light, a loud adversive noise, etc. then response

inhibition would have been much more likely under this circumstance.

Finally it is possible that the results of

tliis

investigation, with

respect to response latency indicate the difficulty of quantifying
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approach behavior.

Because of the problem of controlling
for the

subjective state of the individual response,
latency

,

used to assess

approach could be measuring disparate, if
not contradictory, modes
of behavior.

For example, it may well have been that
of the group of

individuals under the approving condition some may
have responded

more quickly to gain approval while others may
have responded more
slowly in order to insure an approving response from
the experimenter.
The thrust of this experiment encompassed two broad
areas of inquiry.

The first, which has just been discussed, involved an
attempt

to resolve a theoretical controversy in the realm of
personality re-

search and this attempt, for any one or all (or none) of the reasons
speculated upon .produced unsatisfactory findings.

The second broad

area was concerned with ascertaining possible personality environ-

mental interactive effects which may affect problem solving behavior.
Specifically this investigator was interested in whether groups having
extremely high or low scores on the M-C SD scale v;ould exhibit differences in problem-solving efficiency with concept attaininent problems

under different verbal conditions, approving and disapproving.
A number of findings described earlier served as a foundation
for the conjecture that the high M-C SD groups, under censuring feed-

back would be more impaired than the lows in efficiently solving
concept-attainment problems while just the reverse would occur under
.

approving feedback conditions.

It also seemed logical to this in-

vestigator that if an individual scored high on a scale designed

to

assess how much he v/ished to present himself in a socially desirable
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light, that especially with college
students who would be more

keenly attuned to intellectual accomplishment
relative to the
general population, their cognitive functioning
would be more

vulnerable to disruptive impairment under
censuring feedback conditions.

Obversely it also seemed logical that the
supportive

environment of

a

strictly approving feedback condition would have

more positive impact with respect

to the cognitive functioning of

the high M-C SD vis-a-vis that of the lows.

The results of this experiment did not lend support to
the

hypotheses.

The high M-C SD individuals under the censuring feed-

back condition did not perform in any significantly inferior fashion
than the lows in efficiency of problem-solution, and, paradoxically
in light of aforementioned empirical results and logical inferences

made, the high M-C SD people were inferior to the lows in problem-

solving efficiency under the approving feedback condition.

The analysis of variance and the means for trials to solution
indicated that the significant main effect for the feedback conditions

were the result of the significant interactive effects between the
feedback conditions and the personality variables.

Statistical tests

conducted to assess which pair of means made the primary contribution
to the significant interactive effect yielded

significant at p

-^-^

at-

2.16 wiiich

v;as

^or the groups of high M-C SD individuals under

the neutral and approving conditions.

The next largest difference

between group means, the high M-C SD Individuals in the approving
and disapproving^ condition, yielded a

t

= 1.77

which was not significant
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making further tests of significance
between subgroups with small,
Ler
mean differences unnecessary.
In essence then results which were
expected to occur with the

high M-C SD people under the "positive"
unconditionally approving

feedback situation occurred under a neutral
condition which was free,
relatively speaking, from an intense evaluative
atmosphere.

To ex-

plain these somewhat paradoxical findings
the procedural similarities
of this study with the more relevant
experiments described in the first

part of this paper should be commented upon.

Factually the similarities

prove to be almost nil for whereas the feedback
in the prior studies

were either inferred as

a self -regulatory

covert, subtle manner so that

S

mechanism, conveyed in a

was at best dimly aware of it, or made

quite overt but with relatively long time intervals interspersed
in

between delivery, the feedback in this experiment was methodologically
quite different.

In this study

the verbal feedback was almost intrusive

in that it occurred quite explicitly every time

S

made a response and,

as a consequence, had a relatively high frequency of occurrence within
a brief span of time.

Keeping this in mind it should be recalled that the theoretical
controversy, which was not resolved by this study, focused upon the

validity of the two hypothetical constructs which were inferred from
a high M-C SD scale score, high n-app. and def cnsiveness and it was the

former construct, high n-app., that was viewed quite dubiously.

However

there did not seem to be any quarrel with the more general association
of a higli M-C SD score with a need to present oneself in a socially

desirable light.

It is this investigators, albeit quite speculative,
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contention that this consenually agreed upon
"evaluative dependency",
as Crowne and Marlowe call it, of the M-C
SD person in conjunction

with the particular verbal feedback procedure
utilized in this study,
may have interacted and engendered a state of
distractability which
impaired functioning in those abstract skills requisite
for efficient

conceptual

probleii)

solving.

It could be hypothesized that when the

interpersonal evaluative aspect of the feedback is modulated,
as was
done under the neutral feedback condition, the experiment does
yield

results somewhat consistent with those of prior findings with the

M-C SD scale and paired-associate learning (Crandall, 1968) and motor
skill tasks (Strickland and Jenkins, 1964; Wellington and Strickland,
1965; Strickland,
If

1965).

this speculation of a state of distractability as an intervening

variable has any veracity then both specific and general questions are
posed.

Specifically the initial perspectives assumed by this experi-

ment on the nature of reinforcement, and of its effects, have to be
modified.

The complexity of a reinforcement procedure is that even

that procedure whicli ostensibly appears quite simple may contain para-

meters such as modality, frequency of occurrence, and degree of intensity
acting in some unknown interrelated fashion which must be recognized and
taken into account if one is to make accurate predictions as to its
effects.

This statement is especially true when an experimenter attempts

to ascertain or predict how a procedure is going to influence the be-

havior of

a

complex organism such as an adult human being.

Generally, if there is any validity to the speculation advanced as

.
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an explanation for the outcome of this
Investigation then broader
implications are generated for that aspect
of Behavioristic Psychology

having to do with principles of reinforcement.

As is well known, these

principles were formulated and developed in
the psychological laboratory

primarily with infra-human organisms.

These principles have been

frequently applied with empirically documented
success with emotionally
disturbed, exceptional, and retarded children and
chronic, institutionalized, populations being perhaps the most
notable examples.

The

results of this experiment do endorse to a small degree a
prevailing

opinion among many social exientists that these principles of
reinforcement are not as simply applied with any high degree of efficacy
and/or predictability when one is dealing with an adult human being
who possesses complex and intricate capacities for thought and reflection.

However the most obvious criticisim which can be made of the

hypothesized explanation derives from an examination of the results for
the group high on the M-C SD scale under the disapproving feedback

condition.

The question arises as to why wasn't an efficiency, impairing
state of distractability evident under this feedback condition, which,
if anything should be considered mqre_ distracting because of the negative,

evaluative connotation of the verbal feedback ("Wrong").

These par-

ticular results pose a rather critical refutation of the post hoc

theorizing in v;hich this investigator has been engaging and it is

difficult to reconcile

thorn

with the causal explanation of the findings

under the "neutral" and "approving" feedback conditions.

•

51

Perhaps the answer to this seemingly
inherent contradiction resides again in what personality
characteristics the M-C SD scale

purports to measure.

Earlier it was noted that it was the
consensus

of practically all researchers that
people who obtained a high score

have more of a tendency to be concerned about
what others think of
them.

In addition it was also agreed by most, if
not all, that de-

fensiveness was a ramification of this dependency
upon the opinions of
others.

It was the construct,

need for approval, which generated dis-

agreement among investigators.

Substantiating the def ensiveness construct
pirical findings.

waf?

a wealtli of em-

The high M-C SD scale person has been described as,

rigidly defensive in goal-setting (Barthel, 1961), terminates psycliotherapy early in order to avoid the disapproval of the therapist
(Strickland and Crowne, 1963), gives constricted, defensive, low Rorschach

M projective test protocols (Tutko, 1962; Lef court 1969), and, under
various types of social situations behaves, in defensive fashion.
Further evidence includes studies which have used the scale as a measure
of def ensiveness

(Fisher and Kramer, 1963; Boor and Schill, 1967;

Schill and Althoff, 1968).

Though this reasoning may appear specious a thought which has

occurred to this Investigator was that because of this defensive aspect
of his personality the high M-C SD person was not caught off guard,

distracted if you will, by non-supportive

when he committed an error.

«

negative responses from F

Phrased differently, since evidence in-

dicates he is predisposed to expect the worst and therefore adoi)ts

a
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defensive stance in a variety of interpersonal
situations, then

a

learnins task in which verbally punitive
responses from E were used
did not pose any unexpected surprise.

Because of this, unlike under

the approving condition, his concentration
on the task was not impaired

and he performed as well as the other groups.
It is obvious that in attempting to account for
results with the

dependent measure, trials to solution, this investigator
has engaged
in a network of speculations.

Whether or not a case can be made for

more viable explanations this Investigator hopes that
the results obtained
will of theiaselves have some provocative or heuristic value.
To conclude a brief summary is in order.

First the results of

this experiment do not controvert but do in fact lend some crpdcnco
to

the notion that the high M-C SD scale individual has an "evaluatxcn-

orientation" or dependency upon the opinions of others.

However a more

ambitious goal of this study, to analyze the nature of this orientation

was not realized.

Further there was some evidence offered of the im-

portance of the interaction between personality and environmental viriable

upon an individuals cognitive functioning.

Finally broader implications

were alluded to pertaining to certain principles of Behaviorism

.

The

unex))ected results of this study offer some small endorsement to the

conception that attempts to predict human response on the basis of
systematic manipulation of external reinforcement is difficult even

when certain personality characteristics are taken into account.
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TABLE

Me^"A_ajld_^tandan^

1

for averar.e resp on<; e latencies for

the three feedback conditio n

APPROVI NG

MHAHS
STAInDAPJ)

deviations

DISAPPROVING

4.66

5.15

5.69

1.92

2.12

2

96

TABLE

2

Mea:ns_and_^ndard^^^
^'O^^JJ^^Mtj^pjidi^i^ons high or low score on

HIGH M-C SD

MEAWS

.

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

'

thP. M-r.

SD scale.

LOW M-C SD

5.24

5.10

2.12

2

48

^
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TABLE

^lgan§__and_sl^^^^^

3

avera^.e response latencies for the

two conce pt atualnmcnt tasks

CONJUNCT I VE
Ml^Al^S

STAi.'DAriD

DEVIATIONS

DISJUNCTIVE

5.48

4.86

2.57

2.13

.

TABLE 4

Means and standard deviations for average response latencies
of the
personality ;^roups under the three feedback cond t ions

HIGH M-C SD
IJEUTRAL

APPROVING

DIS.\PPROVING

LOW M-P

MEAIIS

5.11

4.21

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

2.03

1.75

MEANS

5.16

5.15

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

1.81

2.37

MEANS

5.45

5.93

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

2.58

3.35

<^'n
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TABLE

5

Means and stan dard deviations for average response latencies
of the
two tasks under the three feedback conditions.

NEUTRAL

APPROVING

DISAPMOVING

CONJUNCTIVE

DISJUNCTIVE

MEANS

5.02

4.31

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

1.60

2.06

MEANS

5.A1

A. 90

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

1.82

MEAiNiS

6.01

5.37

.STANDARD DEVIATIONS

1.81

3.01-

-

2.13
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TABLE

6

Meang^and sLandard deviations for average response latencies
for the
t wo

personality conditions with the two tasks.

CON JUNCTIVE

HIGH M-C SD

LOW M-C SD

DISJUNCTIVE

MEANS

5.58

4.89

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

2.23

3.07

MEANS

5.37

4.82

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

2.7%

3.32
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TABLE

^qg-gnd^tandar d deviations

7

for ave ra.qe response latencies of the
two

pers onall_ty_£rou£s__u_nder the three feedback condi
tions for the two tasks.

CONJUNCTIVE
HIGli

M-C SD

MEANS

5.51

4.71

ST/vNDARD DEVIATIONS

2.34

1.69

MEANS

4.52

3.91

STANDAPJ) DEVIATIONS

2.12

1.30

MEAInIS

5.25

5.06

SIAiluARD DEVIATIONS

1.55

2.11

MEANS

5.57

4.73

2.53

2.20

MEAi^IS

5.99

4.91

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

2.80

2.33

MEANS

6.03

5.84

STAiNDARD DEVIATIONS

3.68

3.14

NEUTRAL

LOW M-C SD

HIGli

M-C SD

DISJUNCTIVi'"

APPROVING

LOW M-C SD

STAiNlDARD

HIGH M-C SD

DEVIATIONS

DISAPPROVING

LOW M-C SD

.
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TABLE 8

Means_and^anJar d deviations for trials

to solution for the three

feedback co ndi_ti o n s

NEUTRAL

APPROVING

D ISAPPROVING

MEANS

17.69

26.52

18.52

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

20.19

22.72

19.20

r

Mcans_mid_stand^

solution for the two

personal_U^/_cjDr^^

,

^^^^^'^^

STAl^DAPJ)

DEVIATIONS

MGilJl-.C_SD

LOW M-C SD

21.07

20.75

18.75

22 23

/
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TABLE 10

Means_ajid_sj.anda^^^

to solut i on for the two c once^pt-

att ainment tasks.

^^EAI^S

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

CONJUNCTIV E

DISJUNCT IVE

12.21

29.61

9.09

2^1

31

I

I

1

I
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TABLE 11

!

I

Means and standard_Je^atlons for trials to^ljxt:
Imw^f.J;]^^

personality p,roups under the three feedback conditions.

HIGH

NEUTRAL

APPROVING

DISAl'PROVING

II-C

SD

LOW M-C SD

MEAIs'S

13.88

21.50

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

15. 8A

22.74

MEAInS

32.17

21.72

STAITOARD DEVIATIONS

23.75

21.72

MEAInIS

17.17

19.88

STAITOARD DEVIATIONS

16.52

21.91

I

.
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TABLE 12

Means and standard dev iations for trials to
solution of
under the three

NEUTllAL

f ecdbackcondltlons

CONJUNCTIVE

DISJUNCTIVE

10.75

2 A. 63

8.11

25.63

MEANS

16.04

27.00

STAIiDARD DEVIATIONS

10.01

2A.60

MEANS

9.83

27.21

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

9.01

22.36

MEANS
STANDARD DEVIATIONS

APPROVING

DISAPPROVING

tlie

.
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TABLE 13

Means and standard deviations for

t rials

to s olution for the tw o

p ersonality conditions with the two ta sks

HIGH M-C SD

LOW M-C SD

C ONJUNCTIVE

DISJUNCTIVE

MEANS

13.36

28.78

STAITOARD DEVIATIONS

11.41

24.36

MEANS

11.06

30.44

8.98

23.75

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

70

TABLE 14

Means^nj_^t^ard deviations

for trials to solu tio n of the tw o

perso nality groups under the three feedback conditions
for the
two tasks.

HIGH M-C SD

CONJUNCTIVE

DISJUNCTIVE

10.08

17.67

9.25

20.19

MEAiiS

11.42

31.58

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

10.17

27.30

MEANS

20.50

43.83

STANDARD DEVIATIONS

11.34

27.24

MEANS

11.58

30.17

STAND/iRD DEVIATIONS

11.43

25.84

9.50

24.83

8.21

19.37

10.17

29.58

7.17

27.32

MEAI-TS

NEUTRAL
STANDARD DEVIATIONS

LOW M-t SD

HIGH M-C SD

APPROVING

LOW M-C SD

HIGH M-C SD

MEANS

DISAPPROVING
STAInIDARD

LOW M-C SD

DEVIATIONS

MEANS
STAITOARD DEVIATIONS

.
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TABLE 15

Analysis of Va rj^ance_ior_y._e_de pendent measure Avera?;e
Response Latency
SOURCE

A

(Feedback Conditions)

B

(M-C SD scale)

C

(Tasks)

S.S.

d.f

M.S.

25.60

2

12.80

0.67

1

0.67

L

AB

11.74

2

5.87

AC

0.25

2

0.12

BC

0.18

1

0.18

512.72

66

7.77

3.59

2

1.80

247.64

66

3.75

S(AB)

ABC
SC (AB)

F
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TABLE 16

Analysis of Variance for the dependent
measure Tripl
SOURCE

A

(Feedback Conditions)

s.s.

d.f

e,

^n

rr-i ^

M.S.

2,283.56

2

1,141.78

3.67

1

3.67

10,902.84

1

10,902.84

AB

2,312.06

2

1,156.03

AC

301.06

2

150.53

EC

1A2.01

1

142.01

23,685.04

66

358.86

450.72

2

225.36

23,328.08

66

353.47

B

(M-C SD scale)

C

(Tasks)

S(AB)

ABC
SC (AB)

* P -tC .05
** P ^.001

F
3.

18*

-

30. 85**
3. 22*

